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1. Introduction
John Rawls famously argued that justice is about the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation. In modern societies, one of the main forms of social cooperation is paid work. 
Most of us have to work in order to make a living, and this takes up a significant amount of our 
time. The unavoidable and time-intensive nature of paid work implies that there are several ways in 
which the structure of labour markets is relevant for justice: Most people cannot avoid paid work, 
therefore it is important to ensure that paid work does not undermine the employees’ ability to lead 
a decent life. And since paid work represents a large part of adult life, an important question of 
distributive justice is who has access to which benefits available through work.
In this paper we argue that the evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs needs to 
be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work.ii Recent theories of justice have often 
focused on the most obvious benefit of work, which also motivates many people to work: earning a 
decent wage, and on the importance of avoiding some of the bads of work: not only health risks but 
also lack of discretionary time and time flexibility, and oppressive hierarchies in the workplace.
Yet, the benefits of work are not one (financial gain), but many. We provide a framework 
for thinking about benefits that we call “the goods of work” because work is a privileged context for 
realizing them. We are guided by three considerations in singling out the goods of work that are 
relevant to distributive justice: First, people find these goods particularly valuable, as indicated by 
the fact that they often motivate people to workiii, and by reflections on these goods in various 
traditions of thinking about work. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in 
which most people are not independently wealthy and therefore have to engage in paid work, they 
have few occasions to realize these goods outside their job, simply because of time constraints. 
Finally, the goods of work are a suitable object of distributive concerns because their distribution is 
regulated by public institutions. It may be that justice requires fairness in the distribution of the 
overall package of benefits and burdens each individual gets from paid work. Alternatively, it may 
be that justice concerns the distribution of each of the goods of work, which we identify as those 
goods that simultaneously meet certain criteria we specify below. In either case, it is important to be 
clear about the goods of work, whose distribution is relevant to justice. We therefore hope to make 
a double contribution: first, to better understand these goods and their analytical – if not always 
practical – separability; second, to show their relevance for distributive justice.
Others have discussed before the importance of “meaningful” work.iv Our account of the 
goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful. Further 
analysis would be needed, however, to determine which if any combination of the goods we discuss 
is necessary or sufficient to render work “meaningful” – analysis in which we cannot engage here. 
By distilling insights from empirical research in psychology and sociology and from various 
traditions of thought about work, we believe that we capture most if not all the central goods of 
work, which, in addition to wages, include: 1) attaining various types of excellence; 2) making a 
social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition.v We discuss 
examples in which one or several of the goods of work cannot be realized to show that they are 
analytically separable, even if in practice they often are simultaneously realizable. 
We suggest a conceptual framework for thinking about the goods of work and for 
broadening the scope of theories of justice in the labour market: The labour markets and particular 
jobs can be objectionable, above and beyond the charge of being financially inadequate and of 
exposing people to certain bads, if the opportunities to realize these goods are distributed unjustly. 
Taking into account other goods of work enhances the relevance of theories of justice to the 
practical questions raised by contemporary labour markets, for example about working 
arrangements that isolate certain employees from the community of other employees, or about work 
that does not give individuals a chance to develop any valuable skills. When resources are scarce, 
the provision and distribution of income may justifiably be the highest priority, because income 
represents the universal means for satisfying the most basic needs. But in many societies today we 
collectively can afford to take into account the broader goods of work.vi It is therefore worth asking 
how labour markets should be designed such that they do not undermine individuals’ ability to 
enjoy these goods, and afford them sufficient, and fairly distributed, opportunities to realize them. 
Unregulated labour markets, or labour markets regulated exclusively with an eye on monetary pay-
offs, can be deficient in offering individuals such opportunities; and inequalities in access to the 
goods of work are themselves a matter of justice.
We advance three claims. The first, and least controversial, is that a multi-dimensionally just 
labour market requires that all employees can avoid the worst forms of the bads of work – bads that 
undermine their ability to lead a decent life, for instance by undermining their health, their ability to 
have a family life, or their standing as equal members of society. The second, central claim is that a 
multi-dimensionally just labour market should not take away employees’ ability to realize the goods 
of work, either within their jobs or in other contexts. Yet, the most attractive jobs are often those 
that actually enable employees to realize the goods of work within paid work. The third, and most 
controversial claim therefore is that the distribution of (opportunities for realizing) the goods of 
work is itself an issue of justice.vii
Several liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice can accommodate the claims 
advanced in this paper. They are compatible with a variety of principles of justice distributions 
(equality, priority and sufficiency) and with most, although perhaps not all, metrics of justice. If 
individuals are owed a fair distribution of welfare, opportunity to welfare, or capabilities, then the 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of work identified here is a matter of justice, since they are 
all plausibly relevant to both welfare and capabilities.viii One kind of resourcism, which exclusively 
identifies income and wealth as the metric of justice seems incompatible with our claims: If it is just 
that individuals be given equal – or perhaps sufficient – amounts of money, but distributive justice 
is indifferent to how these resources are translated into (opportunity to) welfare or capabilities, then 
it is difficult to see why the distributions of the benefits and burdens of work, in particular, should 
be subject to a requirement of justice. ix We hope, however, that our analysis provides a pro tanto 
reason to reject materialist resourcism. Beyond this observation, we do not intend to commit to any 
view on the correct metric of justice. Instead, we see the goods of work as being part of the set of 
goods and policies that ought to be distributed in order to realise a fair distribution of the metric of 
justice (whatever that metric is.)x
A main source of resistance to our approach is the belief that free labour markets give people 
an adequate choice of bundles of goods that can be pursued within one’s paid work. For example, 
John Tomasi’s recent defence of free markets implies that in a free market individuals have 
sufficient opportunity to do the kind of work they would like to do.xi But labour markets often do 
not give individuals such options, and therefore the institutional framework of labour markets may 
need to take the “‘goods of work”’ explicitly into account. These goods are broad and general, and 
they are part of many different conceptions of the good life; that they are so highly valued is, 
indeed, a good reason to think that the goods of work contribute to the welfare of the individuals (at 
least in cases when they are desired). If a non-optional and time-consuming activity such as paid 
work disproportionately deprives workers employees of the goods of work that have significant and 
non-monetary value, this raises a complaint of justice.
In the next section we briefly discuss the bads of work and in the subsequent section offer a 
more detailed discussion of the four broad goods we distinguish: excellence, social contribution, 
community, and social recognition. We then expand on why the non-monetary goods of work are 
relevant to justice. The fifth section addresses the two objections mentioned above: that unregulated 
labour markets can provide individuals with sufficient opportunities to realize these goods, and that 
state neutrality forbids any interference with labour markets. The conclusion consists of brief 
reflections on some possible practical implications of our view.
2. The bads of work
Before embarking on a discussion of the non-monetary goods of work and their relevance to 
distributive justice it is important to acknowledge the existence, and relevance to distributive 
justice, of the bads of work. Some bads of work are merely the absence – or the fall below a 
threshold – of the goods of work. A subgroup of such bads are financial, or have an important 
financial dimension: inadequate pay and lack of benefits like pensions, paid holidays, paid parental 
leaves and health care. Another sub-group of bads of work consist in the absence of the non-
monetary goods of work we identify in this paper (and discuss at large in the next section): 
excellence, social contribution, community and social respect. Some jobs are extremely dull and 
repetitive and therefore detrimental to the development of any skill; or not only fail to make a social 
contribution, but are socially destructive – for example by destroying otherwise viable companies 
for the sake of short term profits or by engaging in socially destructive financial speculation; other 
jobs involve working in constant isolation from one's fellow employees; or seriously undermine the 
employee’s social standing.
But other non-monetary bads of work are not the mere absence of the (monetary or non-
monetary) goods of work. Rather, they consist in failures to protect other important goods, such as 
the health of employees, their discretionary time and, in cases in which jobs are structured by 
oppressive hierarchies, their freedom from non-domination.
Our first claim refers to the bads of work. It holds that they should be avoided wherever 
possible, and where this is not possible, their distribution is relevant to justice. We assume that it is 
the least controversial of our claims, at least with regard to extreme forms of bads that jeopardize 
the conditions for a decent life; with regard to other bads – for instance protection from lack of time 
and hierarchical relationships – it is more controversial, but we here nonetheless assume that it is 
well-grounded: It is unjust if employees are avoidably and knowingly exposed to serious health 
risks, including risks for mental health. Similarly, it is objectionable if labour markets or individual 
jobs undermine important goods such as self-respectxii or personal autonomy,xiii which are basic 
preconditions for forming and pursuing a conception of the good. A frequent objection to 
unregulated capitalist labour markets is that they undermine these goods and therefore violate basic 
standards of justice. Adina Schwartz argued that individuals who are systematically denied 
meaningful work become incapable of formulating, revising and pursuing their own conception of 
the good, and so have their autonomy undermined. If she is right, the requirement to avoid the bads 
of work amounts to the requirement that no job falls below a certain threshold of meaningfulness.xiv 
In many labour markets employees have legal protection from some of the bads of work. The 
International Labor Organisation’s conventions on decent work summarize these requirements, 
which are embedded in many countries’ legal frameworks.
The requirements of justice with regard to the non-monetary bads of work may be plausibly 
broadened to include the availability of a set of options allowing individuals to realize, outside their 
paid work, important goods that are a part of many conceptions of the good life. This concerns, for 
example, people’s ability to care for their families. Daniel Engsterxv suggested that it is unjust if 
people have to make a choice between a decently-paying full-time job that allows them to 
materially care for their families but does not leave them time for realizing a caring relationship 
with them, and a low-paying job that gives them enough time for directly caring for family 
members, but not enough income to sustain them materially. The justice of an economic system, on 
his account, will in part turn on whether individuals can earn enough to sustain themselves and their 
dependants by working in jobs that leave them enough time and flexibility to sustain caring 
relationships with them. Therefore, according to Engster, economic systems should be designed 
such that jobs give adequate pay to support oneself and one’s dependants and enough time to 
engage in regular and frequent interactions with them. Such requirements of justice justify 
regulations of the labour market, at least as long as no other, even more basic requirements of 
justice are violated by them (e.g. everyone’s right to subsistence). This might sometimes diminish 
economic efficiency, especially if efficiency is understood in a narrow monetary sense, but these 
losses in efficiency are outweighed by the importance of avoiding these bads. Insofar as (some of) 
the bads of work might be unavoidable, their distribution is also a matter of justice. 
3. The central goods of work
There is ample empirical evidence that people care about their work as being more than just a way 
of earning an incomexvi. In this section we present a number of goods of work that matter in 
addition to the – undeniable and uncontroversial – good of earning an adequate wage. Drawing on 
empirical research, we identify four categories of such goods: excellence, social contribution, 
community, and social recognition. All of them have played a role in some philosophical tradition 
of thinking about work; we here understand them in a broad and thin sense. Usually, the goods we 
discuss come in degrees. At this level of generality, one can identify the goods of work with 
sufficient objectivity, at least in the sense that one can objectively agree on extreme cases in which 
these goods are absent, and often also on cases in which they are more or less present.xvii
Excellence
Attaining some form of excellence motivates many people to work – indeed, it can sustain 
motivation for life-long involvement with work.  Excellence is a regulative ideal, which is to be 
understood broadly: as the accomplishment of various things such as knowledge, technological 
achievements, or beauty. Excellence includes the development of one’s skills – for example, good 
judgement – , but also the accomplishments resulting of the exercise of these skills – for example a 
good piece of craftsmanship. Thus, excellence refers to the relation between the worker and what he 
or she does rather than to the relation of either the worker or the product to others. 
Work is a privileged context for striving for excellence, which typically requires sustained 
effort and focus and which often, but not necessarily, results in products that are highly valued on 
the market. The fact that acquiring excellence takes up a lot of time, combined with the fact that 
most people have to work a significant proportion of their time, means that achieving excellence of 
some kind can often not be done in one’s free time. At least this is the case for individuals who,  in 
addition to their jobs, have responsibilities for dependants and therefore very little disposable time. 
And excellence obviously cannot be bought with money. Thus, to be able to attain some kind of 
excellence means, for most people, that they have to find a job in which they can attain it.
Philosophy has a long history of recognizing the striving for various forms of excellence . 
As James Murphy emphasizes,xviii the connection between intellect and practice was an important 
element in Aristotle’s conception of work: it is a unity of conception and execution, which takes 
time to achieve.xix The importance of excellence for many individuals is supported by the fact that 
“mastery” is a main motivator for work. Psychological research shows that the right balance 
between one’s abilities and the challenges one encounters in one’s work – and thus the opportunity 
to nurture one’s abilities – is an intrinsic motivator for many individuals, often leading to the 
experience that Csikszentmihalyi has called “flow”, in which individuals are completely absorbed 
in an activity.xx  Hackman and Oldham’s classic Job Characteristics Model,xxi which has been 
validated by numerous studies,xxii argues that jobs that show characteristics such as skill variety, 
task identity (being able to finish one task) and feedback – characteristics that make it possible for 
individuals to acquire excellence in what they do – are associated with numerous positive variables, 
such as higher job satisfaction and motivation. The achievement of excellence has a lot to do with 
temporal dimensions of work: for example, are employees given enough time to acquire solid skills, 
and do they have the prospects of a career in the course of which they can develop their skills and 
learn new ones? 
The separability of excellence from other goods of work can easily be illustrated: Consider, 
for example, the young Marx, grappling with complicated ideas, but lonely, lacking in social 
recognition and genuinely uncertain about the chances of making a social contribution. On the other 
hand, one can realize all other goods – social contribution, community, social recognition, and an 
income – but not excellence, like someone who has to take up a job that does not correspond to her 
talents. In addition, the design of jobs can undermine people’s ability to achieve excellence in other 
areas of life; for example if it leaves them too exhausted to have any extended spare time activities.
Social contribution
People often work because they wish to contribute to their society. While some social contributions 
are realized through highly trained skills and the pursuit of excellence, these are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to make a contribution to society; unqualified work, for example collecting garbage, 
is often the most necessary kind for keeping a society running.
Paid work is a natural context in which to realize the good of social contribution because we 
spend much of our time in it and because it is the typical setting for social encounters aimed at 
producing utility. Ideally, markets should attach monetary value to the things that are most 
necessary for the life of a society. In current societies, however, part of what we cover under social 
contribution, for example care work, is realized through voluntary rather than paid work. Many 
consider the split between “for profit” and “for purpose” markets an anomaly, but it is hard to see 
how it could be eliminated within the current theoretical and practical frameworks of labour 
markets and its focus on their monetary dimension
Having conducted a large sociological study on what people from different occupations 
think about their work, Studs Terkel summarizes his findings by stating that people “search for 
daily meaning as well as daily bread”xxiii, and for many people, seeing the contribution they make in 
their work is an essential source of meaning. A recent study found that deriving “meaning and 
significance” from work has a large impact on the likelihood to stay with an organization, on job 
satisfaction, and on job engagement.xxiv
The good of social contribution can be absent while other goods of work are present, or the 
other way round. A lonely gravedigger can see that her work makes an important social 
contribution, while lacking any sense of accomplishing excellence, receiving recognition, or 
experiencing community. The opposite case is someone who can realizes all of these goods in her 
work, while doing socially useless or even detrimental work. Some who worked in the financial 
industry before the 2008 crash might realize that their work made little, if any social contribution, 
and might in fact have been socially destructive.xxv 
Community
Third, many people are motivated to work by their desire to attain community, understood as the 
experience of doing things together with people with whom they stand in relatively free and equal 
relationships. Community is, of course, valued in many contexts. But arguably working together is a 
specific experience, since it involves being part of a project of collective agency. Community at 
work can come with the special bonus of joint accomplishments resulting from joint sustained 
effort. The joint pursuit of hobbies and civic engagement are alternative ways of realizing 
community, but, as before, in a world where large amounts of people’s time are spent in paid work, 
the latter should not be neglected as a venue for pursuing this good.
Psychologists have long analysed the human need for belonging, the “pervasive drive to 
form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal 
relationships.”xxvi It is no surprise that this drive is also active in the workplace. As Cynthia Estlund 
puts it: “The workplace is the single most important site of cooperative interaction and sociability 
among adult citizens outside the family.“xxvii Psychologists Ashfort and Blake argue that the 
importance of strong social bonds and a common culture at work play an especially important role 
for individuals doing “dirty work”, in order to jointly construct an “esteem-enhancing social 
identity”.xxviii But the importance of community is not limited to “dirty work”; it plays a role for all 
kinds of work. 
Different organizational structures have an impact on how likely it is that employees can 
realize community at work.xxix Conventional capitalist companies are hierarchically structured, 
which means that many relations are not egalitarian. These hierarchies are often a mixture of 
different kinds of authority. Some of them are based on reasons such as the need for coordination or 
superior expertise; they can be justified, at least in principle, to individuals who see one another as 
moral equals.xxx But such legitimate forms of authority are often intertwined with forms of 
inequality that are based on sheer power – typically, because employees depend more on their jobs, 
which provide them with an income, than companies depend on specific employees. The resulting 
imbalances of power are much harder to justify, and are, arguably, a serious threat to the experience 
of community at work. Even those whose “exit options” are better – for example because they 
possess skills that are highly thought after – are affected by this  because the very fact that they rely 
on the threat of exit in order to defend their position within a company can be inimical to the 
development of community.
In order to realize the good of community, other organizational structures, e.g. worker 
cooperatives or other forms of workplace democracy, seem preferable. Thus, the increasing interest 
in, and popularity of, workplace democracy and employee-owned business probably indicates a 
search for, among other things, the good of community at work.xxxi Formal equality, however, does 
not necessarily translate into other relevant forms of equality. As Jane Mansbridge found in her 
empirical work on an urban crisis centre, even in an organization whose members shared a strong 
commitment to egalitarian values there were inequalities in political power. But in this “unitary” 
setting – with shared interests and commitments – the employees nonetheless realized principles 
such as the equal protection of interests, equal respect, and a sense of participation that supported 
personal growth.xxxii Thus, the relationship between organizational structures and egalitarian social 
relations can be rather complex. What matters, in addition to formal structures, is a shared 
egalitarian culture that embeds a commitment to equal respect for all members of a joint 
undertaking. 
Thus, worker cooperatives, or other structures that include elements of workplace 
democracy, are probably the ideal organizational structure from the perspective of community. But 
this does not mean that community, and a culture in which individuals see one another as moral 
equals, are impossible to realize in other structures. Justified authority is, arguably, less inimical to 
community than authority based on sheer power. In most conventional firms there are also 
employees who are on the same hierarchical level, for whom it may be easier to realize community 
among themselves. But these forms of community can be undermined by certain forms of 
hierarchical leadership and the ensuing culture, by excessive competition at the workplace, or by a 
high degree of micromanagement. For employees who are constantly reminded of their lowly 
position in the organizational hierarchy, or who are micromanaged and bossed around, it can be 
very hard, or even impossible, to experience the social relations at heir workplace as a form of 
community.xxxiii
It is clear that community can be present or absent independently of other goods of work. 
For example, it might be very strong in some forms of low-paid work. A group of semi-industrial 
workers who produce socially trivial goods such as cheap decoration articles, which is neither 
challenging nor conductive to much social recognition, can nevertheless realize community among 
themselves, especially if they have some space for jointly organizing the work process. On the other 
hand, people in leadership positions in overly hierarchical job conditions can lack community while 
realizing all other goods. And it is conceivable that having to work in an environment that is 
inimical to community can be corrosive to one’s ability to experience community in other areas of 
life, if long-time exposure to very competitive or hierarchical relationships undermine individuals' 
psychological ability to form and sustain egalitarian relationships.
Social recognition
People also work to receive recognition from others. Incidentally, social recognition is often 
mediated by other goods of work: achievements, social contribution, and even high salaries can earn 
individuals the high regard of others. For a majority of people in this day and age paid employment 
provides by far the most opportunities for gaining social recognition. 
The importance of recognition has been emphasized by idealist philosophers, in particular 
Hegelxxxiv, who held that professional identity can be an important avenue for social recognition.xxxv  
Axel Honneth argued that work is a necessary context for a specific form of social recognition – the 
recognition for one’s achievementsxxxvi Empirical work supports the claim that workers strive for 
social recognition. Terkel notes that the numerous euphemisms that are used in job descriptions, 
such as when a janitor is called a “building engineer”, indicate people’s search for status.xxxvii Yet, 
social recognition is influenced not only by the kind of work one does, but also by one's position in 
a job hierarchy. Given the role that work plays in contemporary capitalist societies, its relation to 
social recognition in current societies is hard to deny. 
Here are some illustrations of the analytical separability of social recognition from other 
goods of work: It can be enjoyed by a lonely stand-up comedian who uses sexist jokes that he 
himself does not find very funny. On the other hand, imagine a team of insurance brokers who 
develop a new business model that can create genuine value for their customers, replacing 
exploitative forms of insurance. They are good at their job and develop their skills, see the social 
contribution of what they do, and enjoy community. But the general bad reputation of the insurance 
industry, and the complexities of the new business model which are hard to convey to the wider 
public, deprive them of social recognition. 
A minimum requirement of justice with regard to social recognition is that one should not 
have to work in a job that undermines one’s ability to receive social recognition. This is relevant for 
jobs that are socially stigmatized, as in the sex industry or in an abattoir. In some such cases the 
way to address the problem is by eliminating stigmatization, in other it may be to share the 
stigmatizing work more equally. 
4. Why are the goods of paid work relevant to distributive justice?
Much of the debate about distributive justice in the last decades focused on the fairness of 
distributing benefits, often understood in monetary terms (or not specified in concrete terms at all). 
It is widely recognized that theorists of justice need to address questions of justice with regard to 
the distribution and security of income, concerning the relationship between paid work and other 
forms of work, or concerning wage discrimination between different social groups. But given that 
paid work is one of the main forms of social cooperation, and one of its most important non-
optional burdens, the issue of justice in the labour market deserves attention beyond the question of 
monetary outcomes. Justice in the labour market needs to be discussed with regard to the 
multiplicity of the goods of work.
We discussed in the second section a first – and least controversial – claim concerning the 
bads of work. Our second and third claims concern the non-monetary goods of work. Their 
requirements are less minimal, and therefore likely to be more controversial. The second claim is 
that in a society in which most people have to work in order to make a living, the economic system 
as a whole and individual jobs can be criticized as unjust if they prevent people from realizing 
goods that meet both of the following two criteria:
1. they have distinctive value because they are very widely desired by individuals as non-substitutable 
elements of their conception of the good life
and
2. they cannot be obtained with money.
The first condition is straightforward: Any institutional arrangement that prevents people 
from enjoying goods that are essential to their (morally innocent) life plans is suspicious, provided 
the society in case is sufficiently affluent to ensure basic necessities to all its members. This also 
holds for the institutional arrangements that regulate the distribution of the goods of work, which 
play a central role in many people’s conception of the good life, and often motivate them to work in 
the first place. The second condition specifies that the complaint holds for cases in which the goods 
in question cannot be obtained with money. By contrast, it is not necessarily objectionable if goods 
that can easily be replaced with money, e.g. clothes, get damaged in the process of working, 
because one can be fully compensated for the loss. But if employees are prevented from realizing 
the goods of work we describe – because they can neither realize them in their paid jobs nor outside 
of them – they suffer the distinctive injustice of being unable to pursue their conception of the good, 
and this cannot be compensated by monetary payments. Of course, the goods of work are not part of 
every individual's conception of the good life. But most people are likely to include one or another 
version of at least some of these goods into their life plan. Thus, it is unjust, ceteris paribus, if the 
labour market or particular jobs are designed in ways that systematically undermine the ability to 
pursue these goods, as long as alternative designs are possible.
One way in which labour markets or individual jobs can prevent employees from realizing 
the goods of work is by not leaving enough discretionary time to realize these goods in spare-time 
activities. In such cases, paid work is the only context in which individuals can hope to realize 
them. Our third claim is that, unless and until the social organization of work will allow for 
sufficient discretionary time for individuals to realise the goods the above criteria outside their paid 
job, justice in the labour market requires a fair distribution of opportunities for people to realize 
them within their paid work. If it is true that the goods of work are central to individuals’ 
flourishing lives, and as long as we live in societies in which their realization is closely tied to the 
nature of paid employment, the equal concern owed to all individuals implies that their distribution 
is a matter of justice.xxxviii
The questions of workers' discretionary time and of their reliance on paid work in order to 
make a living are crucial considerations in thinking about justice in the distribution of the goods of 
work. We would have less, if any, reason, to be concerned with the distribution of the non-monetary 
goods of work if we were to reform employment such that people spent much less time in paid 
worked and had more time flexibilityxxxix. To an even larger extent, the introduction of a universal 
basic income would diminish the importance of a fair distribution of people's ability to realise the 
goods within their job. Some economists interested in meaningful work take the importance of 
meaningful work as a ground for introducing a basic incomexl. And it has been argued that the 
provision of a basic income would count as giving citizens a reasonable option to engage in 
meaningful workxli. We do not commit here to any claims concerning the all-things-considered 
desirabilityxlii of a basic income, nor to its feasibility. But, if desirable and implemented, a basic 
income would significantly weaken the case for distributing the goods of work in the context of 
paid jobs, as well as the case for regulating jobs against the bads of work, because people could 
afford to opt out of the labour market. Reversely, the importance of the goods of work (other than 
money!) for justice can be a pro tanto argument for an unconditional basic income if it turns out to 
be difficult to regulate their fair distribution within paid work.
Absent a basic income, and given long working hours, the distribution of the non-monetary 
goods of work within paid employment raises a concern of justice. One way of addressing this 
concern would be the large-scale introduction of workplace democracyxliii, affording employees 
considerable freedom in shaping the nature of their jobs. Absent such a radical reform, which we 
assume will not be enacted in the foreseeable future, questions about the distribution of the goods of 
work have an impact on the regulations of the labour market. 
5. Unregulated labour markets and state neutrality
Libertarians, for example Robert Nozick or Tomasi, may respond to our account by claiming 
that an unregulated labour market can offer people the bundles of goods they desire, and that it is 
therefore the best arrangement for providing employees with an opportunity to take into account 
monetary as well as non-monetary goods: For instance, if someone values community at work, she 
can choose a job that is maybe less well paid but gives her a great experience of community.xliv 
Some economists, starting with Adam Smith, have argued that the overall attractiveness of jobs is 
inversely related to the income they earnxlv,  because if a job is attractive, it is in higher demand and 
hence the wage will drop, and vice versa.xlvi
Even if this were an adequate description of actual labour markets, it would not mean that 
labour markets secure access to the goods of work. Some goods of work are inevitably scarce 
because there is not enough consumer demand. The distribution of scarce desired goods is a matter 
of justice, and it is by no means obvious that an unregulated labour market best realizes a fair 
allocation. In addition, there are problems that mar real, in contrast to textbook, labour markets. 
Anne Phillips has recently pointed out the dangers of taking on board ideal accounts of markets in 
theories of justice.xlvii This warning is especially pertinent to discussions about labour markets. Not 
only are individuals’ starting bargaining positions extremely different; their bargaining positions 
within the labour market over time are also likely to be different, even if none of them is in a 
situation of existential risk.xlviii Consider, for example, the material and non-material costs of losing 
a job for someone who has to take care of a family, has bought a home and become rooted in a 
community. This provides employers with considerable market power, which they can use to lower 
wages or otherwise decrease the quality of the job. The differential in the “exit options” from 
contracts creates unequal power – a problem that Adam Smith signalled with regard to capital 
owners and workers,xlix Given the threat of unemployment, many employees (especially those who 
are least educated, healthy, and those deemed socially unsuitable) enjoy little if any real 
occupational choice. In fact, the worst paid jobs often tend to be the least attractive in non-material 
terms as well, failing to provide any of the goods of work discussed here. The option of becoming 
self-employed, which might be suggested as an alternative, presupposes the availability of capital 
and of sufficient demand for the services one can offer through self-employment; these conditions 
are often not fulfilled. 
The idea that unregulated labour markets could accurately respond to people’s preferences, 
and hence that wages could reflect the value of the bundle of immaterial goods people get from 
their jobs, is so idealized that it seems hardly justified to apply it as a general principle to real world 
labour markets. It may apply to some subgroups, e.g. to engineers working in large corporations 
versus engineers working at research institutions. But even in such contexts, markets are likely to be 
distorted by many other factors, including sheer luck. For example, research shows that whether one 
starts one’s professional life during an economic downturn or upturn can make a difference for 
one’s income for the rest of one’s life.l Another problematic factor are cultural prejudices that lead 
to lower pay for certain jobs, e.g. jobs that have traditionally be taken up by women.li 
In sum: labour markets are often not able to give people a smorgasbord of options from which 
they can choose the bundle that gives them access to even a minimum of the non-monetary goods of 
work. This holds, in particular, for people in the midst of their professional careers: often, the 
character of one’s job unpredictably changes in ways that would make other jobs more attractive 
when it is too costly for people to switch jobs. The imperfections and imbalances of power in labour 
markets mean that individuals can be stuck in jobs with bundles that score low on many relevant 
goods. Leaving labour markets unregulated with regard to the non-monetary goods of work gives 
disproportionate bargaining power to individuals who posses certain morally arbitrary 
characteristics such as health, youth or geographic mobility, while leaving almost no bargaining 
power to other individuals.
A second objection to our account comes from the liberal attachment to state neutrality. 
Richard Arneson,lii one of the few liberal egalitarians to address the issue of justice in production, 
initially argued that if the state favoured the provision of jobs with certain characteristics, this 
would give preferential treatment to some conceptions of the good over others: “implementing the 
right to meaningful work elevates one particular category of good, intrinsic job satisfaction, and 
arbitrarily privileges that good and those people who favor it over other equally desirable goods and 
equally wise fans of those other goods”.liii More recently, however, Arneson himself rejected this 
line of criticism and now thinks that justice can mandate the provision of meaningful work for 
everyone.liv  Like Arneson, we provide reasons for allowing state inference to protect people from 
the bads of work – or, more controversially, to promote its goods – that do not hinge on any 
particular conception of the good life.lv  We do assume a mild version of perfectionism according to 
which the goods of work, at least when desired, make an objective contribution to how well 
individuals’ lives go. Therefore, employees whose conceptions of the good life include (some of) 
these goods should all have at least sufficient opportunities to realise them.lvi
Yet, labour markets unregulated with respect to the goods of work do in fact strongly 
privilege individuals whose conceptions of the good exclude the goods of work discussed here. 
Labour markets are structured by a set of rules and regulations, however minimal, set and 
sanctioned by the state. These rules and regulations are likely to make it easier for employees to 
pursue certain conceptions of the good life and to exclude some from access to the goods of work. 
The conceptions typically favoured by the rules of labour markets assume one main income earner 
per family (stemming from the assumptions that employees are free from the most urgent duties of 
care) and they assume that money is the most important good pursued in work (stemming, maybe, 
from the influence of economic models based on utility functions that include only money and 
working hours). They practically exclude a majority of employees from access to (many of) the 
central goods of work.
According to our mildly perfectionist view, this is an injustice that a perfectly neutral state (if 
such a state is at all possible) seems unable to address. State neutrality or lack thereof does not 
depend on whether as a matter of fact some citizens’ conceptions of the good are privileged by 
particular institutional set-ups. Rather, it depends on the reasons behind institutional design. A 
neutral state ought to show equal respect to all its citizens' conception of the good by limiting 
distributional efforts to all-purpose means. However, as we have argued, the goods of work cannot 
be obtained in exchange for money and long working schedules make some of them difficult or 
impossible to obtain outside work. This means that just – as opposed to existing – distributions of 
resources such as money and income would not go a long way in ensuring everybody’s access to 
the central goods of work, absent further regulation.
5. Conclusion  s  
In a just society, workers should have real, rather than merely formal, options with regard to the 
bundle of goods they want to realize in their work; this claim supplements, but goes further than, 
claims about the avoidance of the bads of work. Because there are several goods of work, inequality 
with regard to work is multidimensional. At the very least, the working life of individuals should be 
such that the realization of these goods in other parts of their lives is not undermined. But given 
how much time most individuals have to spend at work, stronger claims can be made about the 
realisability of these goods within paid work, and the distribution of access to these goods within 
paid work. 
Many current labour markets fail to live up to this ideal, often as a result of unequal 
bargaining power between employers and employees. This results in some jobs being well-paid, 
interesting, interactive, challenging and well-regarded, while other jobs score low on many or all of 
these counts. This leaves many employees little opportunity to realise the goods of work discussed 
here.
What does our account amount to in practice? We can here provide only some general 
suggestions. Part of the challenge will consist in operationalising the conceptual framework offered 
in this paper: it may be difficult to measure the goods of work and evaluate their distribution, 
especially since different kinds of work may score higher or lower for different individuals with 
different talents and interests. This difficulty may count as a reason not to try to regulate labour 
markets directly, but rather to deem a basic income, or workplace democracy, or both, as the most 
appropriate reforms for a fair distribution of the goods of work. But direct regulation may be a more 
feasible option, and the problems of operationalization may be surmountable if one focuses on 
preventing extreme cases that concern jobs that fall below minimal threshold with regard to one or 
several goods of work. 
The practical applications of our approach are likely to be most relevant for employees who 
are neither qualified, young, healthy, nor geographically mobile – in short, those for whom it is 
most costly to leave a job in which they cannot realize goods that are important to their conception 
of the good life. The most obvious applications concern cases in which the degree to which 
individuals can realize the goods of work falls below some critical threshold, or there is no 
opportunity at all. A concrete policy area in this context is the way in which employment agencies 
ought to treat individuals who need to find a job on pain of having their unemployment benefits 
terminated. Rather than helping individuals find any kind of job that lets them earn an income, they 
should be somewhat sensitive to the individuals’ preferences for the goods of work they want to 
realize. This, of course can only be part of the solution, since it does not as such solve the problem 
of whether such jobs are actually available and within reach.
A more detailed discussion of applications would have to take into account not only 
concrete social circumstances, but also questions of feasibility – e.g. trade-offs with economic 
efficiency – and the importance of other values such as gender justice or ecological sustainability. 
Labour market policies that take our second and third claim seriously could look radically different 
from the ones we have at the moment. While the examples we suggest are steps that could easily be 
realized in the current situation, a consistent application of our principles could lead to much more 
radical changes.
One can distinguish two categories of practical implications, which lead to different, but 
compatible, strategies for improving the current situation. The first concerns the question of how 
states can support individuals who are not able to realize important goods of work in the context of 
paid work. The second concerns the availability of a broad array of jobs with different 
characteristics, which unfolds into two subcategories: regulations of labour markets that concern 
their non-monetary dimensions, and the provision and character of public employment.
The first strategy concerns steps that a society can take in order to support individuals who 
cannot realize the central goods of work in their jobs, but would like to realize them elsewhere. 
Here, an important issue is the balance between time spent at work and discretionary time. For 
example, different Western countries have different rules about how many days of holiday 
employees standardly have. More holidays may or may not come at the cost of economic efficiency, 
but arguably not at the cost of realizing a more just society, given the fact that many jobs do not 
allow for an adequate realization of some, or all, of the goods of work. In a society with more 
holidays, individuals have better opportunities to realize their conception of the good, because they 
have more access to some of the goods of work outside paid work. The same holds for societies in 
which it is possible to earn a wage with lesser rather than more hours per week. The distribution of 
discretionary time is itself a matter of justicelvii; arguably, it is of particular importance for those 
who are unable to realize the goods of work in their jobs. 
Another element of the first strategy concerns individuals who want to leave jobs that score 
very low with regard to the goods of work, or even undermine the ability to realize these goods. For 
example, being a sex worker can undermine one’s opportunities for social recognition not only on 
the job, but also in other social spheres. Given how grave the lack of social recognition for some 
jobs can be, the state should give workers the practical means to leave such jobs. It is justified to 
use tax money to offer them exit options and training in other jobs, even if workers in these jobs can 
avoid other bads of work, such as threats to their physical or mental health. In some cases, however, 
if the low social status of some jobs is unjustified, states ought to take measures to counteract the 
prejudices held against them.
With regard to the second strategy our account implies, at the most general level, that a 
society should consider its labour market as a multidimensional space of just and unjust 
arrangements, and this should be reflected in the ways in which it is regulated. Indeed, many 
existing debates about labour markets can only be understood under the assumptions of a variety of 
goods of work. For example, debates about the regulation of temporary work that takes place 
alongside regular employment invoke not only monetary questions, but also questions about the 
social standing of the temporary workers and about lack of social inclusion. Debates about different 
management styles raise questions about how much competitive and hierarchical ethos is justifiable; 
as we noted, competition and lack of autonomy are often antagonistic to the experience of 
community
These debates show that societies do not only have to make choices about the degree of 
material inequality. They also have to make choices about how different non-monetary goods are 
balanced against income and wealth, for example with regard to the character of available jobs. By 
providing good public education, states may shift from an equilibrium with many low-qualified jobs 
towards an equilibrium with many more demanding jobs in which individuals can experience 
excellence. With an educated workforce, it becomes possible to start high-tech companies, and 
better educated employees are also more likely to be able to run jointly-owned enterprises, in which 
they have higher chances to enjoy the goods of community and social contribution. Another aspect 
of this issue is the kind of jobs offered in public service. These can be tailored differently from the 
jobs typically available in the private economy, so that the variety of jobs overall is increased. 
Furthermore, the facility with which people can be dismissed has an impact on the possibility of 
building communities at the workplace – if people know that there is a higher likelihood of staying 
in a job for longer, it is more worthwhile to put one’s energies into creating and maintaining 
community bonds. Thus, employment protection has not only a monetary dimension, but also an 
impact on the social ties at work. Arguments along these lines are periodically made in political 
struggles about labour market regulations, but it is hard to articulate them as long as the mainstream 
discourse on work concentrates on the fairness of pay, at the exclusion of other goods of work.
We hope to have taken a step towards connecting theories of justice with these on-going 
political struggles by sketching an account of the central goods of work and arguing for their 
relevance for a just labour market. Whether or not the violations of justice in this context are 
sufficiently large to justify coercive regulation, or whether non-coercive means – for example 
nudging – might be preferred, has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In any case, jobs that fall 
below a certain threshold with regard to one or several of the goods of work should stand under 
special scrutiny – even if they do not impose severe bads of work, such as health risks, on 
employees – to make sure that employees have really chosen them voluntarily. Although some 
cases are likely to be controversial, extreme cases are easy to recognize and to agree on. Justice 
with regard to the labour market requires that we think about the goods of work (other than 
money!).
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